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Abstract 
Japan’s economy experienced prolonged recession which had never been observed before. This 
paper focus on the events in Japan’s economy since 1985, tracing how the asset prices inflated and 
collapsed, and how the Bank of Japan responded to the deteriorating economy. We will learn from 
the Japan’s experience that it becomes more difficult for monetary policy to reactivate the economy, 
once it falls into the deflation.  We will conclude that the BOJ should not have ignored the role of 
money stock by showing the statistical evidence of the relationship between money stock and the 
economic activity.    
 
Keywords:     bubble, deflation, money stock, financial anxiety     
 
 
Introduction 
 
Japan’s economy experienced prolonged recession which had never been observed before. The 
recession is characterized by rapid decline in assets prices which substantially accumulated the 
nonperforming loans. The mounting nonperforming loans, especially in the financial sectors, 
hampered the normal functions of financial intermediaries and Japan’ economy came to the verge of 
financial panic.  
 
   The financial distress and deflation is rooted in the so-called bubble economy of the latter half of 
the 1980s when the economy has experienced the expansion of bubbles in assets prices. This article 
will focus on how the strong economy deteriorated and how the authority, especially the Bank of 
Japan responded to its deterioration. We will divide the periods we focus on into 2 period, before 
and after the burst of the bubble and latter will be divided into several periods. 
 
   We will conclude that the BOJ should not have ignored the role of money stock by showing the 
statistical evidence of the relationship between money stock and the economic activity. We will 
perform Johansen’ s cointegration test by taking the financial anxieties into consideration. The 
lessons form Japan’s prolonged recession and the policy response would be much useful not to 
repeat the same disaster.        
                                                 
* The original paper was presented at the seminar of University of Tampere on August 24, 2005. The 
first author stayed at Faculty of Economics, University of Tampere in the summer of 2005. He wishes to 
thank Prof. Jari Vainiomäki and other staff for their useful suggestion and warmish hospitality.  
 
1 The emergence of the bubble (1985-89) 
 
It was September 1985 when the Minister of Finance and governor of the central bank of G5 
countries (United States, United Kingdom, France, West Germany, and Japan) gathered to Plaza 
hotel in New York to discuss how to correct the trade imbalance between US and Japan and West 
Germany, especially how to reduce the huge trade deficit in US. The US had suffered from huge 
trade deficit, which might be caused by then president Regan’s economic policy, so-called 
Reganomics characterized by strong dollar and high interest rates. US congress had taken very hard 
stance to the Japanese increasing trade surplus and threatened with retaliating trade measures. 
 
   G5 countries had agreed to concert to depreciate the high dollar in the meeting. The cooperative 
interest reduction had begun. In 1985, long-term interest rate in US. was 10.8 percent, while that in 
Japan was 5.8 percent as shown. The difference was 4.7 percent as shown in Figure 2 when the 
exchange rate was 250s yen per dollar. In August 1986, US’s interest rate was reduced to 7.3 
percent while Japan’s rate was 5.2 percent. The difference was reduced to 2.1 percent, which caused 
the rapid yen’s depreciation from 250s to 150s (see Figure 1). However Japanese current account 
balance did not decrease in spite of the yen’s appreciation. US government was afraid that the 
further appreciation of the yen would make the Japanese economy so stagnant and would be counter 
productive to the US economy. Japanese economy was in the slight recession due to the high yen 
after Plaza agreement. So US gave the pressure to stimulate the Japan’s domestic demand and to 
raise the imports. 
 
   In the February 1987 Louvre agreement, Japan was demanded to take further easy monetary 
policy. The Bank of Japan reduced the official discount rate to 2.5 percent, the lowest level in 
response to the Louvere agreement in February 1987, while US increased the discount rate to 6.0 
percent as shown in Figure 3.  As a result, the difference between the long-term interest rate in US 
and that in Japan expanded from 2.2 percent to 4.5 percent which depreciated yen to the normal 
level, 140s yen. 
 
   Money growth had started to rise in 1987 Q1. It grows more than 10 percent from 1987 Q1 
through 1990 Q2. It was the beginning of the Japanese bubble.  Some feel that the low discount rate 
might cause the inflation. However market crash had happened in NY in October 1987. G7 
countries decided to cooperate to take easy monetary policy to avoid the world depression. As a 
result, Japan has to keep the low interest rate policy. However the Bundesbank (central bank of 
West German) raised the discount rate and returned monetary policy to the neutral level (4.5 
percent).  
     
   The reason why only Japan had to keep the easy monetary policy is as follows. The dollar was 
still weak to the Japanese yen. It was thought that the dollar would be rapidly depreciated and bond 
and stock price would substantially decrease and cause the depression in US, if the BOJ raise the 
discount rate. Then people had thought the BOJ would never take the tight policy and the easy 
policy would continue for a long time1. 
 
   Under the assumption of affluent funds available, Banks were very aggressive and irritated to 
make a loan. Anybody could get loans very easily from the banks as far as they have lands as 
collateral because they were believed to keep increasing forever. Large firms could get funds easily 
by using “equity finances”. So banks had tried to expand the loans to household and small firms 
                                                 
1 See Suzuki (1993) in more detail.  
which had not enough collateral with the expectation of their rise. Even housewives were advised to 
manage the apartment by borrowing money from the banks. 
 
   The stock prices and land prices had rapidly increased from 1988 through 1989 as shown in 
Figure 5 and 6, which could not be explained by the fundamentals. The increasing of assets prices 
did not respond to the first rise of the discount rate in May 1988 from 2.5 to 3.25 percent and the 
second rise in January 1989 from 3.25 to 3.75 percent at all. The bullish expectation had dispelled 
the negative effects on the asset prices. The asset prices kept increasing. 
 
2 Prolonged recession after the burst of the bubble 
 
2-1 The burst of the bubble (1990-93) 
 
The BOJ implemented the third rise of discount rate from 3.75 to 4.25 percent in December 1989. 
The market was still bullish. However the market had begun to change, when the new governor, 
Mieno had showed very strong stance to the bullish economy by fourth rise of discount rate from 
4.25 to 5.25 percent2. The governor Mieno had implemented the fifth rise of discount rate to 6.0 
percent to avoid the home made inflation caused by the Gulf War in August 1990. The government 
also placed a ceiling on the total amount of financing availed for real estate purchase. The burst of 
the bubble had begun at last. Money stock (M2+CD) rapidly declined. It recorded negative year on 
year growth in mid –1992 as shown in Figure 4. After hitting a record high of 38,915 yen at the end 
of 1989, the stock price rapidly began to decline. In August 1992, stock price dipped below 15,000 
yen, a 63 percent plunge from peak level (see Figure 5). Land prices began to fail after hitting a 
peak in September 1990 and still keep falling now as shown in Figure 6. 
 
      In response to the asset price decline, the BOJ reduced the discount rate six times from July 
1991 to February 1993. The discount rate was ultimately reduced from 6.0 percent to 2.5 percent 
(see Figure 3). The government also implemented the fiscal stimulus by spending a total of 29.9 
trillion yen in two years from 1992 to 1993. Those policy measures seemed to succeed in 
recovering the economy. 
 
2-2 Modest Economic Recovery (1994-96) 
 
In 1994, the economy showed signs3 of a recovery because of the stimulus policies. However there 
remained some adverse factors. 
1. Firms were obliged to continue the adjustment of their balance sheet damaged by the decline 
of assets price. 
2. Land prices still kept decreasing 
3. Hyogo Bank failed in 1995. It was the first bank listed on the Tokyo stock Exchanges. 
4. The highly appreciated yen hampered the export industries. Yen reached at record high level 
of 79.75 yen per dollar on April 19, 1995. 
5. The great earthquake attacked Kansai districts and seriously damaged its economy in 1995. 
6. Prices especially whole sale prices continued to decline and increased the deflationary 
pressure. 
 
                                                 
2 New governor Mieno was called a “Heisei no Onihei”, who had strongly fought against the gangs as a 
leader of police officers in the Edo period more than 200 years ago. 
3 Mori, Shiratuka, and Taguchi (2001) indicate the increase of residential investment and the business 
investment in 1994 as signs of recovery. See in detail N. Mori et al (2001) figure 4 and 5.   
   Under these conditions, the BOJ continued to decline the discount rate from 1.75 to 0.5 percent 
successively as shown Figure 3. The government also increased the fiscal expenditures4. The 
Ministry of Finance had issued a report entitled “Reorganizing the Japanese Financial system 
(kinyu shisutemu no kinoukaifuku nituite)” in June 1995, in which they showed diehard attitude to 
tackle with the NPLs problems by officially disclosing the magnitude of bad loans totaled 40 trillion 
yen (about 4 percent of the loans held by depository institutions).  
 
   Further more MOF had strongly pledged the complete deposit guarantee by March 2001, the 
reform of the Deposit Insurance Corporation and Prompt Corrective Act. As a results, several 
symptoms appeared to indicate the economic recovery.  
 
1. Bank lending began to increase which had rapidly decreased after the burst of the bubble (see    
      Figure 8). 
     2. Stock prices gradually increased in the latter half of 1995 and reached at 20,000 yen in      
         September 1995 (see Figure 5). 
     3. The long –term interest rate began to increase with the expectation of the recovery. 
    
Every body thought that the financial problem was under control and the recession had come to end 
at last. 
 
2-3 Serious recession (1997-98)   
 
The prime minister Hashimoto, who convinced the recovery of the Japanese economy, implemented 
the measures to reconstruct the Japanese finance. He was afraid that fiscal condition would get 
worse and worse with the coming of aging society in Japan. He decided to increase the consumption 
tax from 3 to 5 percent and abolish a special income tax cut in April 1997, which amount to a tax 
increase of 9 trillion yen. Unfortunately to the Japanese economy, the East Asian economic crises 
had occurred in July 1997. The fiscal contraction compounded by Asian crisis decreased the 
aggregate demand.  
 
   Under the deflationary conditions, the financial panic had occurred. Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, 
one of Japan’s city banks (largest twenty banks) , and Yamaichi Securities Company, one of 
Japan’s four largest security company, failed in November 1997. The Failure of both big financial 
institutes sent the signs that the government gave up the “too big to fail” policy. People thought no 
financial institutes were immune from failures. Rumors about the other banks’ failure had spread 
out through Japan. The stock prices of many financial institutes sharply declined and “Japan 
premium” in the international money market jumped by around 100 basis points. Japanese banks 
were obliged to pay the additional basis points for raising funds in oversea financial markets. The 
premium is calculated as the difference between the quoted rates of TIBOR in the Tokyo offshore 
market and LIBOR in the London offshore market.  International credit-rating agency (such as 
Moody’s) graded down Japanese bonds issued not only by financial institutions but also by 
government. 
  
   In response to the serious situation, the government decided to provide a 30 trillion yen funds by 
issuing bonds. The government was not willing to inject the public funds into the problem banks by 
considering the negative sentiments of the congress and public at first. However the financial panic 
was so severe that neither the congress nor the public strongly opposed to inject the public funds to 
                                                 
4 The new policy package was entitled “Emergency Measures for Yen Appreciation and the Economy”. 
See in detail N. Mori et al (2001) P.62. 
assist the problem banks. The 30 trillion yen was divided into the following two categories. 13 
trillion yen was prepared for the enforcement of the Deposit Insurance System, while the remaining 
17 trillion yen was intended for the capital injection of the problem financial institutes.   
 
    The government actually injected 1.8 trillion yen to 21 large banks to raise their capital ratio in 
March 1998. However as Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito (2000) suggested, it had no significant effect 
on the banks because it was lax. It was a waste of public funds, when Long-Term Credit Bank and 
Nippon Credit Bank had failed in 1998 after the injection of public fund. 7.5 trillion yen was again 
injected in March in 1999. The implementation was quite deferent from the former injection. Banks 
were strongly required to submit detailed and meaningful restructuring plan5.  
 
   The government hesitated to quickly resolve the nonperforming loans and bank problems which 
weekend financial institute and caused long recession. The government officially announced in late 
1995 that nonperforming loan totaled 38 trillion yen, 4 percent of outstanding all loans. In 1998, 
nonperforming loan increased at 73.1 trillion yen, 12 percent of all loans or 10 percent of GDP. All 
efforts by the government and private banks to decrease nonperforming loans did not succeed in 
reducing them at all because of the severe deflationary pressure.  
 
   The Japanese economy was thus caught in a vicious circle, so called deflationary spiral indicated 
in Irving Fisher (1933).  (Too tight policy)— Decline in asset prices—Deterioration of balance 
sheet (Increase in debt burden on borrowers) – Decline in Investment and Consumption—Decline 
in employment and wage—Deflation. 
  
   GDP recorded negative growth for 5 consecutive quarters from the 1997 Q4 onward (for the first 
time since the start of GDP statistics in 1955). 
 
2-4 Expansionary Policy (1999-) 
 
   In response to the serious situation, The government decided to take a expansionary fiscal policy. 
1. Special tax reduction (2 trillion yen) 
2. Economic stimulus package (totally 16 trillion yen) 
3.  Revision of the Financial Structure Reform (temporally freezing) 
4. Public funds was increased from 30 to 60 trillion yen in October 1998, based on the 
Financial Reconstruction Law and the Financial Function Early Strengthening Law  
5. Injection of public funds to major financial institutes (7.5 trillion yen) 
 
   The BOJ adopted further easy monetary policy by reducing the uncollateralized overnight call rate 
to 0.25 percent in 1998. The BOJ also took the so called zero interest policy by reducing it to 
virtually zero percent (0.01 percent) in February 1999 as shown in Figure 11 . Further the BOJ 
adopted the untraditional monetary policy, so-called quantity easy policy by putting the bank 
reserve on its target (see Figure 12). They committed to keep the new policy until the CPI registers 
stably either  zero percent year on year or an increase and to increase in the outright purchase of 
long-term government bonds, in case they consider the increase necessary for providing liquidity 
smoothly.  Now they conduct money market operations, aiming at the outstanding balance of 
current accounts held at the Bank at around 30 to 35 trillion yen (5.20, 2005).  Owing to these 
expansionary policies, the financial panic seems to settle down. However Japanese economy 
remains still stagnant. 
 
                                                 
5 See Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito (2000) p.66 in more detail. 
 
3 Evaluation of BOJ’s policy 
 
   We now focus on the evaluation of the BOJ’s monetary policy response in the prolonged 
recession. We try to examine whether the BOJ took the appropriate easy policy to prevent the long 
–lasting recession. First we check the behavior of the Marshallian k, i.e., the ratio of money stock to 
nominal GDP. We need to compare its movement with the trend line in order to evaluate the size of 
magnitude of easy policy (see Figure 14) . The trend line is computed over the period from 1980 to 
2005. Marshallian k started to exceed the trend line from 1997, when the BOJ began to take much 
easier policy following the Louvre agreement. It gradually declined after reached at peak in 1990. It 
began to decline less than the trend line and bottomed out in 1997. It started again to increase and 
exceed the trend line in 2001, when the BOJ implemented the radical quantity easy policy.  
 
   Next we try to examine the BOJ’s policy by using the McCallum rule (McCallum, 1988). 
McCallum rule is an adaptive policy formula with a target of monetary base. With this rule, 
monetary base growth rate changes in response to deviation of the nominal GDP growth rate from a 
desired target value that grows at a specified rate. Okada and Iida (2004) compared the movement 
of actual monetary base growth with that of adequate monetary base growth based on the 
McCallum policy reaction rule as shown in Figure 76.  According to their results, adequate 
monetary growth rate derived from the McCallum policy rule remained less than actual monetary 
growth in the bubble period from the half of 1980s. On the contrary, the adequate base growth has 
been consistently exceeding the actual base growth indicating that the volume of monetary base has 
remained insufficient since 1991.The results suggest that monetary policy was too easy in the latter 
half of 1980s and too tight since 1991 and do not respond properly to the external shock which 
affected the Japanese economy.  
 
   We now turn on the behavior of the money stock which remains stagnant despite of the BOJ’ 
efforts to increase it. As Mori, Shiratuka, and Taguchi (2001) indicate, the reason of the stagnant of 
money stock seems to be related with drastic change in firms’ borrowing behavior and financial 
institutions’ lending behavior since the bursting of the bubble. Firms substantially increased their 
liability in the bubble period with the bullish expectation. However they turned to intensify to 
reduce the liability under the deflationary pressure. 
 
   On the contrary financial institutions decreased their capital to deal with nonperforming loans, 
have to reduce the lending to keep their own capital ratio at adequate level. They have to contract 
their lending as shown in Figure 8, because they are compelled to raise the capital/assets ratio to 
meet the international standard imposed by Bank for international Settlement, so-called capital 
adequacy standard. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) indicated that the informational asymmetry 
between borrowers and lenders create market imperfection by generating agency costs. According 
to their theory, the decline in assets prices lowered the collateral values and raised agency costs, 
which contributed to the decline of bank loans.  
 
   As Tankan Survey shows in Figure 9, financial institutions adopted a stringent attitude toward 
lending to firms especially to small and medium-sized firms. This survey asks firms their view of 
the lending attitude of financial institutes. The lending attitude was the most stringent in 1998. DI 
can be calculated by the difference (percentage) between the firms perceive “accommodative” and  
the firms perceive “severe” . Accommodative  means firms perceive that financial institutions are 
                                                 
6 The base growth rule was computed under the assumption that target rate of nominal GDP is 5 
percent (3 percent real GDP growth and 2 percent inflation). See Okada and Iida (2004) in more detail. 
willing to satisfy their credit request, while severe means firms perceive that financial institution are 
reluctant to lend. 
  
   Thus, we conclude that both reduction in firms’ excess liability and financial institutions’ 
nonperforming loans’ problem contributed to the credit decline as shown in Figure 8. The decline of 
loan rapidly decreases the money multiplier as shown in Figure 13, which contribute to offset the 
BOJ’s efforts to increase money stock. Thus, the decline of loans cause that of deposit and, by 
extension, money stock. The stagnant of money growth can be thought as key factor to make the 
economy so stagnant for a long time. 
 
4 The relationship between money and economic activity 
 
We examine whether or not there exists a long-run equilibrium relationship between the money 
stock and economic activity in Japan. We focus on the relationship between three variables; the real 
money stock, real GDP, and the opportunity cost measured as the difference between the interest 
rates on the money stock and that on other financial assets. If a long-run equilibrium relationship 
exists between the real money stock, real GDP, and the opportunity cost, we could say that money 
demand rises in line with increase in real GDP or decline in the opportunity cost. The system model 
is described by the VECM in the following: 
 
 ∆rm(t) = cm0 + αm ect(t-1) 
        + ∑i=1k cmi ∆rm(t-i) + ∑i=1k dmi ∆y(t-i) + ∑i=1k emi∆r(t-i) + εm(t)                        (1) 
 
∆y(t) = cy0 + αy ect(t-1) 
        + ∑i=1k cyi ∆rm(t-i) + ∑i=1k dyi ∆y(t-i) + ∑i=1k eyi∆r(t-i) + εy(t)                           (2) 
 
∆r(t) = cr0 + αr ect(t-1) 
        + ∑i=1k cri ∆rm(t-i) + ∑i=1k dri ∆y(t-i) + ∑i=1k eri∆r(t-i) + εr(t)                            (3) 
  
       ect(t) = rm(t) + βyy(t) + βrr(t) + const.                                                                (4) 
 
where 
rm(t) is real money stock 
y(t) is real GDP 
r(t) is opportunity cost 
ect(t) is an error correction term  
 
 
   Our results of cointegration test are as follows as shown in Table 1. 
1. A long-run equilibrium relationship between real money stock, real GDP, and the 
opportunity cost can be found in the sample period before late 1997. 
2. However, the long-run equilibrium relationship can no longer be detected in the sample 
period expanded beyond late 1997, when financial anxieties over the Japanese financial 
system emerged. 
 
 
   The reason why the relationship between the money stock and economic activity has been 
unstable seems to be related to the financial anxiety rapidly increased after the sudden collapse of 
big financial institutes in 1997. The financial anxieties drastically increased the precautionary 
demand by both firms and household.  
    
  We need to comprise a new variable to explain the rise of precautionary demand for money after 
1997. The new variable has to capture the psychological change of people due to the financial 
anxieties. We used the Corporate Financial Position Diffusion Index issued quarterly by Bank of 
Japan known as Tankan in order to qualify the unobservable variable.  
    
   We formulate the model as follows7.  
               tttt raterateDI εβββ +∆−∆+=∆ −10                                                                 (5) 
where DI is the diffusion index for the financial position, rate is the interest rates on loans and tε   
 is an error term, which shows the influence of irregular or unexpected factors other than interest 
rates on loan. The financial anxieties can be captured as the variance of this error term1. 
   We here introduce TARCH (Threshold Autoregressive conditional Heteroscedasticity ) or 
Threshold ARCH model for the error term tε  with asymmetric variance property8. 
       
   The TARCH model with asymmetric variance property for the conditional variance of the 
innovations is 
1
2
1
2
1
2
110
2
−−−− +++= ttttt Ihh γεβεαα            (6) 
Where  = 1      if 1−tI 1−tε < 0 
         = 0      otherwise 
In this model, for TARCH effect, the asymmetry termγ  > 0 and the condition for non-negativity 
will be 0α ≥ 0, 1α ≥ 0, β  ≥ 0 and .01 ≥+ γα  The conditional variance  is subject to an impact 2th 1α  
from good news ( 1−tε  ≥ 0), while an impact ( γα +1 ) from bad news ( 1−tε < 0). This kind of 
asymmetric property corresponds to the situation such that the psychological change of people due 
to the financial anxieties increases the precautionary demand and that an easy financial position 
does not rise the precautionary demand. 
Table 2 Estimation of TARCH model (1976Q3-2005Q1) 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
0β  0.053084 0.236598 0.224364 0.8225 
1β  -0.000344 0.008962 -0.038433 0.9693 
2β  -0.026407 0.009873 -2.674603 0.0075 
Variance Equation 
0α  1.240864 0.879154 1.411429 0.1581 
1α  0.058104 0.117175 0.495876 0.6200 γ  0.256846 0.145875 1.760722 0.0783 
β  0.573227 0.196519 2.916904 0.0035 
 
                                                 
7 The original model was used by Kimura and Fujita (1999). However their model has some problems 
coming from the naive application of time series data in such away that DIt is regressed by ratet and 
ratet-1 .  So we use here the modified growth rate model. See in detail J. Rahman, S. Miyagawa, and Y. 
Morita (2005). We checked the time series property of DI and rate by KPSS and PP test. The results 
showed that both of DI and rate are integrated of order one, I(1).    
     
8 This model should be called GJR model in a strict meaning.  
Estimation results are shown in Table 2. The sign of all parameters seem to be reasonable in 
economic sense. Since a rise of  implies easy financial position and a rise of ∆ratetDI t means that 
of interest rate, 21 ββ +  should take a negative value. The parameter γ  of  takes a positive 
value and hence the conditional variance is shown to exhibit asymmetric property, though the 
significance levels of some parameters are not sufficient. Figure 16 depicts the behavior of  as a 
variable of financial anxieties
1
2
1 −− tt Iε
2
th
9. 
   Anxieties variable DVt is seen to rise at first from 1992 to 1994 (the first financial anxiety in 
Japan), when small credit unions and cooperative failed because of an increase in the nonprofit loan 
caused by the rapid decline of stock and land price after the bust of the bubble. As we already 
discussed, the Japanese economy began to show the modest recovery in late 1995, when real GDP 
began to increase and the official estimation of NPLs decreased10. As a result the financial anxieties 
had been dispelled in 1995. 
   However, the economy sharply declined in 1997 when Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto had 
declared the rise of the consumption tax from 3 to 5 percent and the end of temporary income tax 
cut. Major Japanese financial institutions had failed in November 1997 (the second financial anxiety 
in Japan). Japan Premium, which is the additional rate Japanese banks have to pay for raising funds 
in the international money market, jumped by around 100 basis points. Financial anxieties spread 
out through the country. People’s anxieties tremendously increased, as indicated in the rise of DV in 
1998.  
   Then DV rapidly decrease after 1999. As we already discussed, the Bank of Japan had adopted an 
aggressive monetary easing policy and the Japanese government also decided to inject the public 
fund to the banking sector; the amounts are 1.8 trillion yen in 1998, 7.8 trillion yen in 1999. Both 
efforts of the BOJ and the government had succeeded in dispelling the financial anxiety. Thus, DV 
rapidly decrease after 1999. 
   The results of the cointegration test taking the financial anxiety into consideration are also shown 
in Table 1.  We performed the Johansen’s cointegration test in the same model as equations (1)-(4) 
by taking into account a new variable DVt of financial anxieties. However we cannot directly 
                                                 
9  Mathematically speaking in Eqs.(5) and (6),  the shock )1( −tε  at (t-1)-period affects the increase of  in the 
next step at t-period.  However, in the real economy, companies react to a big shock within the same period (t-1).  
Therefore, hereafter in our analysis,  is shifted by one-step, that is, the financial anxieties variable denoted by 
 is defined by . 
)(2 th
)(2 th
)(tDV )1()( 2 +≡ thtDV
 
10 Hutchison and McDill (1999) also estimated the financial crisis by using the probit model and got the 
similar results as ours. Their results indicate that the likelihood of a banking problem sharply rose in 
1991, reached at a peak in 1992, and sharply declined after 1993, while it was very small (bellow 10 
percent) until 1990. The following Figure is taken exactly as in Hutchison and McDill (1999). 
 
contain a new variable into Eq. (4) because anxieties variable denoted by DVt (=c1ht+1+c2 2 1+th ) is 
stationary.  We regard the above DVt as precautionary demand caused by the financial anxieties and 
define a new money adjusted by precautionary demand: 
               rmnew(t)=rm(t)-DV(t)                                                                                                  (7) 
 The estimation procedure to find out the optimal parameters c1 and c2 of DVt (=c1ht+1+c2 2 1+th ) is 
shown in Appendix. Our results suggest that there still exists a long-run equilibrium relationship 
among adjusted money, real GDP and opportunity cost, though the equilibrium relationship has 
been broken down in the model ignoring the financial anxiety. 
 
    
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Results of Cointegration Tests 
(1)  1980Q1 to 1997Q4 
 
 Johansen’s Cointegration Test Parameter estimated 
Sample period 
80/1Q - 97/4Q 
Maximum 
Eigenvalue Test 
Trace Test 
yβ                    rβ  mα                      yα                     rα  
Without 
Anxiety 
19.6528** 
(21.132) 
33.2316*** 
(29.797) 
-1.5777 
(0.0374) 
0.0259 
(0.0055) 
-0.0170 
(0.0425) 
0.0747 
(0.0414) 
-7.1550 
(1.7843) 
With Anxiety 22.1170** 
(21.132) 
38.7857*** 
(29.797) 
-1.5791 
(0.0348) 
0.0185 
(0.0055) 
-0.0165 
(0.0805) 
0.1296 
(0.0406) 
-5.5670 
(1.7733) 
 
(2) 1980Q1 to 2000Q3 
 Johansen’s Cointegration Test Parameter estimated 
Sample period 
80/1Q - 00/3Q 
Maximum 
Eigenvalue Test 
Trace Test 
yβ                    rβ  mα                      yα                     rα  
Without 
Anxiety 
15.1762 
(21.132) 
26.4932 
(29.797) 
-1.5330 
(0.1436) 
0.0828 
(0.0230) 
-0.0109 
(0.0106) 
0.0048 
(0.0112) 
-1.8737 
(0.4983) 
With Anxiety 18.9276* 
(21.132) 
32.6801** 
(29.797) 
-1.6447 
(0.0497) 
0.0318 
(0.0085) 
-0.0074 
(0.0544) 
0.0635 
(0.0275) 
-4.6240 
(01.2424) 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate rejection of null hypothesis at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level 
 
Conclusion 
   
The lessons from the prolonged Japan’s depression could be summarized as follows. 
 
1. The BOJ targeted the nominal exchange rate in the monetary policy.  It tried to manipulate 
the nominal exchange rate to correct the current account imbalance between Japan and US 
which was originally caused by structural imbalance between domestic savings and 
investment. They should have been more independent.  
2. The BOJ did not realize the scare of deflation.  The BOJ kept the position that monetary 
policy should be used neither to raise the stock price nor to save the financial institutes even 
after the burst of the bubble. Such BOJ’s stance provided very negative effects on the 
financial institutions and stock prices. At the early stage of the recession, the BOJ thought 
that some downward pressure on prices was what has been referred to as “good deflation,” 
resulting from technical change and the increase of cheap products from China and  
deregulation in Japan’ rigid service sector. It was often said at the time that Tokyo is the 
most expensive city. 
3. Even after the burst of the bubble, the “myth of ever-rising land price” survived, which 
made policy makers and banks too optimistic in the sense that they expected the land price 
and economy to recover so soon. That would be one reason why BOJ’ policy was too late 
and too timid. Deflation has raised the debt burden on the borrowers substantially. 
4. Monetary conditions should have been eased quickly and more aggressively. The BOJ 
officials often says that monetary conditions were already  extremely low which might 
hamper the effort of both firms and banks to adjust their damaged balance sheet. Further low 
interest policy was thought to incur the moral hazard. This policy stance reminds us of the 
US. Federal Reserve in the Great Depression in 1930s.   
5. The government was reluctant to disclose the nonperforming loan statistics. They thought 
those problem would be rapidly improved once the anticipated recovery occurred. They took 
the forbearance policy. They published NPLs of only the then 21 major banks in 1992, and 
published the statistics for each of banks in 1993. The regional banks only started to disclose 
in 1994, The statistics were widely admitted as underestimated by the flexible definition of 
nonperforming loans. 
6. Both the BOJ and the government had lacked in adequate prudential policy. Thus, they have 
to take “buying time” policy, to gain time to make the adequate policy and construct the 
safety net.   
7. They should have paid attention to the behavior of money stock. Both inflation and deflation 
are monetary phenomenon in the long-run. Money stock is still important as a information 
variable. The BOJ have to pay close attention to its behavior. Inflation targeting policy 
might be necessary if money stock remains stagnant. 
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(source) Bank of Japan 
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                                Figure 5 Stock Price ( Nikkei 225) 
(source) Tokyo Stock Exchange                                            
                              
 
                          Figure 6  Land Price (year on year) 
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               Figure 8 Bank Loan Growth Rate (year on year) 
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           Figure 9 Lending Attitude of Financial Institutions, DI 
 
(source) Bank of Japan, TANKAN 
 
                                    Figure 10 Inflation Rate (GDP deflator) 
(source) Bank of Japan                                             
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(source) Bank of Japan 
                                Figure 13 Money Multiplier 
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                                   Figure 14  Marshallian K 
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Appendix 
 
Since financial anxieties  and   are stationary, we cannot directly contain the variable 
and  in the cointegration relationship in Eq.(4).  In order to overcome this difficulty, we 
introduce the following assumption: 
)(th )(2 th
)(th )(2 th
[Assumption]  Denoting financial anxieties and and precautionary demand 
respectively as  
)(1 tDV )(2 tDV
)(tDV
              and      )1()(1 +≡ thtDV )1()(2 2 +≡ thtDV
)(2)(1)( 21 tDVctDVctDVDemandaryPrecaution +≡ ,                                              (A-1) 
money is adjusted by precautionary demand: 
        .                                                                                      (A-2) )()()( tDVtrmtrmnew −≡
 
Remark:  Precautionary demand can be defined in a more general form of  
L+−+ )1(~)(~ 21 tDVctDVc  .  For simplicity of calculation, we only adopt the simultaneous term in 
Eq.(A-1).   
 
We shall consider the system model of new variables  which is just the same as 
that in Eqs.(1) to (4) with the variable  replaced by a new one .  Notice that, from 
Eq.(A-2),  .      
))(),(),(( trtytrmnew
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Equation(1) for  can be described by using  and . )(trmnew∆ )(trm )(tDV
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                                                                                                                     (A-3) 
where an error correction term is calculated for the set of variables 
            ))(),(,))()((( trtytDVtrm −
[Estimation of  and ]   1c 2c
[Case-1](no cointegration)  If cointegration property does not hold, then Eq.(A-3) without 
can be estimated as nonlinear estimation problem by gmm (generalized method of 
moment) and   estimated  and  produce a new money variable  from Eq.(A-2). 
)1( −tect
1c 2c )(trmnew
[Case-2](cointegration)  If there holds cointegration property, then the folloing algorithm is 
applied to find out the parameter and . 1c 2c
(i) Set initial values of  and  as the estimated values  in [case-1]. 1c 2c
(ii) Calculate a new variable )()()(~ tDVtrmtmr new −≡ . 
(iii) Calculate VECM and an error correction term )1( −tect for variables ))(),(),(~( trtytmr new  in 
Eqs.(1) to (4). 
(iv) Insert into Eq.(A-3) and estimate  and  along with the procedure of [case-1]. )1( −tect 1c 2c
(v) Using the estimated and  obtained in the above (iv), go to the procedure (ii) and iterate 
(ii) to (iv) till estimated  and  converge to some constants. 
1c 2c
1c 2c
 
The above procedures of estimation are carried out in the interval (1980q1, 2002q1) and the 
estimated results for and  in Eq.(A-1) are given below: 1c 2c
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Hence, Eq.(A-2) is given by 
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VECM with financial anxieties 
After deciding the parameters  and , the system model in Eqs.(1) to (4) is rewritten with new 
adjusted variable : 
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where ect(t)  is an error correction term defined by 
             ..)()()()( consttrtytrmtect rynew +++= ββ                                               (A-7) 
